Chapter 3

THREE MOTIVATION SYSTEMS BUT ONLY ONE SELF-ESTEEM?

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ABSTRACT

In our studies on violence at school and school failure, we did not find any significant correlations between, on one hand, two different scales measuring empathy (B.E.E.S.: Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale) and C.E.C.: (emotional Contagion, Empathy, and emotional Cut-off) and, on the other hand, a scale measuring self-esteem (E.T.E.S.: the Toulouse self-esteem scale).

Moreover, it is the teenagers experiencing school failure and emotional cut-off who, paradoxically, express the strongest scores for self-esteem. Self-esteem is a complex concept measured with different types of scales. Could these scales represent different psychological processes according to the motivations expressed by the subjects?

To explain these results and answer that question, the authors propose using a complex model of human motivations comprising three complementary and/or antagonistic systems of motivation. We wish to show how each system, comprising the whole range of feelings from frustration to pleasure but in three different registers, can explain a facet of the total self-esteem.

In the first system of motivation, the reassurance motivation results from the care to which each one has been subjected, i.e. the unconditional acceptance of oneself. To have been able to receive that kind of gratifying feedback from an external reference, and feel it, feeds our idea that we are then estimable and worthy of attention.

The innovation motivation comes from the intrinsic pleasure one feels each time one gains in autonomy, that one overcomes ordeals that one succeeds during training. Self-esteem resulting from this is due to the fact that one has an internal reference in this case, and it is the consequence of our own awareness of our merit and value.

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The addiction motivation constitutes a hypertrophy of the reassurance motivation; the pleasure is obtained in the active, conscious or subconscious search for situations of dependence on products (exogenous drug-addiction), on behaviours (endogenous drug-addiction) or on people (as in “love addiction”). In this search, the person can feel an insatiable desire for recognition and seeks outside himself the signs that he is worthy of respect. Just as with an addiction, self-esteem resulting from it is only temporary and makes the person seek an inaccessible feeling in an external reference, with logic of “more and more”, because this is incompatible with the innovation motivation which is developed only as an internal reference.

In conclusion, the authors propose adding the usual categories of self-esteem scales (social self, physical, school...), by three groups of items likely to reflect additional motivations, i.e. the reassurance and innovation motivations and one antagonistic one, i.e. the addiction motivation. Because it is opposed to the dynamics of two others, the latter, locks the person up in repetitive behaviours and maintains him in a psychological status quo.

Keywords: Self-esteem; empathy; emotional cut-off; motivation; academic achievement; gender differences

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the authors propose a psychological explanation to an apparently paradoxical phenomenon. In the context of a previous study on the description and prevention of violence and academic failure, (Favre, 2007, Favre, Joly and Reynaud, 2011), two populations of secondary school pupils were studied in Switzerland. They were teenagers who had no academic difficulties and who were going on to do long studies at high school that is called long course, generally leading on to a university course, and those whose too weak school results during the first two years of secondary school have directed them towards more technological studies and training for a particular job, following what is called short course. The scores obtained with different tests for measuring empathy (Favre, Joly, Reynaud, Salvador, 2005; 2009) showed that it is the students with the biggest school difficulties who obtain low empathy scores and high emotional “cut-off” scores. Now, these are the very students with the highest “self-esteem at school” scores, measured using the scale devised by Oubrayrie et al. (1994). This type of paradoxical result has already been pointed out (Pierrehumbert et al., 1992). From our point of view, we make the hypothesis that its origin can be found in the complex nature of self-esteem which has never been taken into account so far.

Although self-esteem may be defined as a more or less positive attitude that a person shows towards himself, as proof of the consideration and respect that this brings or the feeling he has of his own value, there are many different conceptions of the self (Rosenberg, 1979). Most authors are in agreement in recognising that the concept of the self has a multidimensional nature, which means that each individual elaborates an overall concept of himself made up of multiple different conceptions of himself (Markus and Wurf, 1987).

Furthermore, many authors distinguish two aspects in self-esteem: personal esteem, which consists of a feeling of personal efficacy (Bandura, 1997), and a feeling of personal value, with these two aspects corresponding to the confidence and respect that an individual
has towards himself respectively. Campbell and Lavallee (1993) distinguish overall personal esteem from the concept of the self, as the latter refers to a knowledge, a perception, a description of oneself. Indeed, these authors specify that the concept of the self is related to knowledge of oneself, «Who am I?» whereas self-esteem is related to a personal evaluation: «How do I feel in relation to who I think I am?». However, Mruk (1995) emphasises that these two dimensions, one linked to the feeling of skill and the other linked to one's value, interact together to form personal esteem.

Martinot (2001) also distinguishes these two dimensions or components. Without confusing them, we suggest jointly approaching the cognitive self component, conception of oneself, and its affective component, self-esteem, however restricting this to the field of school.

Conceptions of oneself and self-esteem also depend on values adopted or constructed by the people taking part in the research. «Studying self-esteem, means also reintroducing the values as a matter of the subject's science being developed, in action or in interaction… it is important today to reintroduce values, not our own (those of researchers) but those of the subjects under study as major elements and determinants in the way their action and thought systems function…» (translated from Tap, 1998, p. 11-12).

Values seem to be inherently linked to motivations. What would a value be if it could never motivate anyone? Studying the affective dimension of values makes one wonder about the psychological links that exist between a subject's values and his motivations. As these depend on the social context, values may favour motivations aimed at psychological development or, inversely, activate motivations for maintaining the psychological status quo, or to regress. Clarifying these values becomes an unavoidable stage in being able to distinguish, not only the motivations and the desires that allow a «developing subject» to grow up, but also those that are opposed to his growth (Favre, 2008, 2010a).

In this chapter we suggest describing three motivation systems and values that we identified in order to understand how, depending on these values and motivations, self-esteem at school and, generally speaking, overall self-esteem may reflect different facets. Some are only slightly related to the subject's real skills or to his capacity for being linked to and aware of his own emotions. Conversely, arguments will be brought forward to show the interest of combining items in the self-esteem measurement scales to help pinpoint the subject's motivations and value systems for each category of self-esteem.

1. SELF-ESTEEM AND EMPATHY: PARADOXICAL RESULTS

Here we present original extracts from wider research to do with validating a test for empathy (Favre et coll., 2009), research which is necessary to find indicators of the efficacy of specific training for teachers on the prevention of violence and academic failure (Favre, 2007). In this study on 204 youths, we used three different measuring tools.
1.1. Population

The subjects in our study were French-speaking students corresponding to samples who were accessible to researchers due to specific agreements with public teaching establishments. All 204 of these pupils aged 10 to 15 were attending three secondary schools in the canton of Vaud in Switzerland (94 went to V… secondary school, 38 of whom were in 5ème, 28 in 8ème doing a short course and 28 in 8ème doing a long course; 69 at R.. secondary school, 37 in 5ème and 32 in 8ème doing a short course; 41 at P… secondary school in 8ème doing a long course).

These students filled in the first version of the C.E.C. test (see below), Mehrabian's B.E.E.S. test and the E.T.E.S. (Toulouse Self-esteem Scale).

1.2. Measuring Tests

**The Empathy, Emotional Contagion and Cut-off Scale (C.E.C.)**

The C.E.C. test is a new scale for measuring empathy based on a historical, theoretical and critical study aimed at assigning a precise place for empathy within one's own vast conceptual field (Favre et al., 2005). This new scale for measuring Empathy: « Cut-off/Empathy/Contagion » (C.E.C.) makes it possible to apprehend this in a finer way, by clearly distinguishing closely related phenomena, namely (1) Emotional Contagion and (2) what we call "Cut-off from one's emotions".

The first version of this test, used here, enabled us to calculate three scores, each ranging from 0 to 12, for each youth:

- The number of responses in the emotional contagion category which is defined as the involuntary almost identical reproduction (nature, intensity) of another person's emotion or several other people's emotions;
- The number of responses in the empathy category which is considered as the intentional reproduction of representations of other people associated with a partial reproduction of his emotions;
- The number of responses in the cut-off from one's emotions category which represents an almost total blockage of the reproduction of the emotional processes implied in contagion and empathy.

**Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (B.E.E.S.) (Mehrabian, 1996)**

A translation of this test was used in our previous research (Favre 2007; Favre et al., 2009). This test contains 30 items each associated with a 7-point Likert scale. It is formed of two series of 15 items by which empathy can be measured: 15 are labelled in a positive way (we called them B.E.E.S. positive) and 15 in a negative way (B.E.E.S. negative). A total score is derived from the two positive and negative scores according to the formula: Total score = algebraic value of positive B.E.E.S. – algebraic value of negative B.E.E.S.). To make our analysis, we will take the positive and negative scores and likewise the total score. The Cronbach's alpha score supplied by the author was 0.87 for the total score.
The Toulouse Self-esteem Scale (E.T.E.S.)

This test was inspired by already existing scales like Harter's Self-Perception Profile for Children scale (SPP) (Harter, 1982). It is a one-dimensional scale integrating different facets of self-esteem referring to various domains of the youth's life. Five sub-dimensions are distinguished: the emotional self, the social self, the academic self, the physical self and the future self. The overall self-esteem score is established by using the complete set of 60 items. This test was developed and validated for 9 to 16 year-old youths by Oubrayrie et al. (1994). The internal robustness of the test as evaluated by means of Cronbach's alpha test was 0.66 for the total score with values ranging from 0.20 to 0.68 for the 5 sub-scales.

1.3. Relationship between the C.E.C., B.E.E.S. and E.T.E.S.

The construct validity of any measuring tool is always relatively complex to demonstrate. The usual procedure is to relate the test in question to a set of other tools which are theoretically more or less correlated with this test. This is exactly what we did by checking the link between the C.E.C., B.E.E.S. and E.T.E.S. Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients obtained in the two studies enabling these analyses. For the teenagers of this study, only four correlations turned out to be significant. These were negative (but relatively low) correlations between Contagion and the emotional self of E.T.E.S. (-0.21), between Empathy and the future self of E.T.E.S. (-0.17), between Cut-off and the social self of E.T.E.S. (-0.17) and the future self of E.T.E.S. (-0.28), the latter being the highest. The total B.E.E.S. score does not correlate with the total E.T.E.S. On the other hand, certain E.T.E.S. sub-scales correlate slightly with the B.E.E.S., especially the future self of E.T.E.S. which correlates significantly with the total B.E.E.S. (0.32), the negative B.E.E.S. (-0.29) and the positive B.E.E.S. (0.25). The positive B.E.E.S. correlates with the emotional self of E.T.E.S. (-0.17) and the negative B.E.E.S. correlates with the social self of E.T.E.S. (-0.19).

Table 1. Construct validity of the C.E.C. scale: correlations with other scales (n=204; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Emotional self E.T.E.S.</th>
<th>Emotional Contagion</th>
<th>Emotional Empathy</th>
<th>Emotional Cut-off</th>
<th>Positive B.E.E.S.</th>
<th>Negative B.E.E.S.</th>
<th>Total B.E.E.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>-0.21**</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>-0.28**</td>
<td>0.25**</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The authors of the E.T.E.S. (Oubrayrie et al., 1994) mention that, for psychometric reasons, the “future self” could not be integrated with the other dimensions of the scale (very low Cronbach alphas) and suggest removing it. Now, it is the scores for this dimension in particular which correlate significantly with empathy (-0.17), cut-off (-0.28), total B.E.E.S. (0.32), negative B.E.E.S. (-0.29), and positive B.E.E.S. (0.25). The total B.E.E.S. scores do not correlate either with those of the total E.T.E.S.
We may note that the academic E.T.E.S. is the only component of the E.T.E.S. which has no correlation with the other dimensions of the tests used. In the following paragraph we will see that this constitutes a discriminating variable for our study.

1.4. Comparisons between Courses

The aim of the study carried out in Swiss secondary schools (see Table 1) was to check whether the fact of belonging to a course orientated towards shorter studies with a more technical content reserved for students with learning difficulties could be related to the scores obtained from different tests, in comparison with the longue course destined for pupils who go on to do further studies (high school, universities…).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>Courses</th>
<th>F-test</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long (n=69)</td>
<td>Short (n=60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.E.C. Contagion</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.E.C. Empathy</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.E.C. Cut-off</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>28.39</td>
<td>29.73</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>-15.14</td>
<td>-5.91</td>
<td>13.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>43.53</td>
<td>35.65</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>11.58</td>
<td>11.27</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>9.49</td>
<td>8.93</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>40.49</td>
<td>41.13</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the short course, cut-off from one’s emotions is significantly higher than for the long course (2.46 vs. 1.81) and empathy is significantly lower (7.08 vs.7.82). These differences are not attributable to the unequal representativeness of genders. However, there is no differentiation between the two groups of pupils for emotional contagion. Furthermore, in the short course the negative B.E.E.S. is significantly stronger than for the long course (-5.91 vs. -15.41), which is coherent with the value of the “cut-off” scale. This difference between courses disappears in the total B.E.E.S. Indeed, as we have already shown, the positive B.E.E.S. accounts for emotional contagion and empathy together, thus counterbalancing the difference obtained with the negative B.E.E.S. (Favre et al., 2005).

With the E.T.E.S., the only significant difference observed concerns academic self-esteem which is higher in the short course (5.05 vs. 2.16). This result is surprising in that, in the short course, cut-off from one's emotions measured both by the B.E.E.S. negative component and by the cut-off component of the C.E.C. is higher. It is therefore in this course where we find the most teenagers of both sexes (mean = 13.6 years) who are the least in contact with their own emotions and therefore less capable of identifying them.
Realising that the gender variable may interfere with these results, we distinguished girls from boys in Table 3.

Table 3a and 3b. Comparisons of means for the scores obtained by pupils depending on which educational course they were following and the three tests used. Table 2a for girls and Table 2b for boys

Table 3a.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>Courses / Girls</th>
<th>T-test</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long (n = 38)</td>
<td>Short (n = 26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut-off (C.E.C.)</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy (C.E.C.)</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>2.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion (C.E.C.)</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>1.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>34.07</td>
<td>40.34</td>
<td>2.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>-17.47</td>
<td>-10.38</td>
<td>1.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>51.55</td>
<td>50.73</td>
<td>- 0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>2.798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3b.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>Courses / Boys</th>
<th>T-test</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long (n = 34)</td>
<td>Short (n = 29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut-off (C.E.C.)</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>2.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy (C.E.C.)</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>- 1.830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion (C.E.C.)</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>- 0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>23.58</td>
<td>21.61</td>
<td>- 0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>-12.48</td>
<td>- 2.50</td>
<td>3.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total B.E.E.S.</td>
<td>36.06</td>
<td>24.11</td>
<td>-2.2775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic self E.T.E.S.</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>0.467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NS: non-significant.

With E.T.E.S., only academic self of E.T.E.S., which scores according to courses are different in boys and girls, is presented.

In girls, empathy is significantly lower for the short course (6.88 vs. 7.76) but the positive B.E.E.S. is higher (40.34 vs. 34.07). Emotional contagion is also higher (3.42 vs. 2.84). This latter difference is not significant but reminds us that the positive B.E.E.S. accounts for items which refer to emotional contagion and not empathy as we have redefined it.

The paradoxically very low academic self-esteem score for girls doing the long course (0.65 vs. 5.19 for the short course) should also be pointed out.

For the boys, the cut-off component is significantly higher (3.05 vs 2.13) in teaching courses for which the accent is on technical or manual learning. A significant difference also exists between the two courses for the boys as regards negative B.E.E.S., which is higher for short courses (~2.50 vs. -12.48). This is reflected in the total B.E.E.S. The long course has a higher total B.E.E.S. (36.07) than the short course (24.12).
So, depending on which educational course they are following and their academic success, there is a difference between genders, focused mainly on cut-off from one’s emotions (measured by the C.E.C. and the negative B.E.E.S.) in boys and empathy (measured by the C.E.C. and positive B.E.E.S.) and academic self-esteem (measured by E.T.E.S.) in girls. So cut-off is therefore stronger in boys with school difficulties. Academic self-esteem is lower in girls who succeed at school whilst at the same time they show more empathy.

1.5. Interpretations

With our results it is possible to observe that academic self-esteem does not seem to be positively associated with academic success, whereas this is the case for empathy in girls.

Furthermore, cut-off from one's emotions particularly measured in boys by two different tests (C.E.C. and negative B.E.E.S.), associated besides this with academic failure and violence, is stronger in the short course (Favre, 2007; Favre et al., 2009). Now, Table 1 shows that academic self-esteem is correlated neither with empathy nor with cut-off from one's emotions. We therefore asked ourselves two questions: how can one have a good opinion of oneself whilst being cut-off from one's emotions or incapable of being able to name them and identify them? How do we explain that this phenomenon is more pronounced in girls than in boys?

Confirming our observations, it would appear that youths define their social skills more through self-affirmation, interpersonal initiative and leadership rather than through empathy which is designated by the dimension « dévoilement de soi–empathie » (Michaud and coll., 2006) (translated by the authors: revealing of self/empathy). Furthermore, a study on pupils in difficulty has shown the importance of comparison with others (Pierrehumbert et coll., 1992). Those who are in a « bad » pupil situation, placed in a normal class, clearly underestimate themselves. However, those who stay down a year have the same level of self-esteem as their classmates, probably because they feel relatively comfortable with a programme they already know. Those who are placed in a specialised course – with reduced numbers and compensatory teaching - are more satisfied with themselves than pupils following normal courses. As they are assessed differently, they feel that they are “working hard at school”, whereas their productions are of a low level.

A certain number of authors point out that pupils who are behind with their school work apparently manifest no repercussions on their self-esteem, and would even tend to overestimate themselves (see Perron, 1969; Pierrehumbert et al., 1988; Pierrehumbert & Rankin, 1990; Pansu & Bressoux, 2000; 2002).

Baumeister et al. (1996 and 2000) put the emphasis on the possible gap between “represented” evaluations (which depend on a personal estimation) and “true” evaluations. These interpretations lead us to formulate the hypothesis that those subjects with the greatest (unfavourable) differences between their self-image and evaluation of themselves by others should present higher levels of aggressiveness. This makes self-assessments like the ones we used seem rather suspect, as they can only provide a very superficial indication of self-esteem and rather reflect the subject’s level of narcissism.

As often found with short courses for pupils with school difficulties, we were also able to show that they are also the ones whose modalities in relationships with others lead them to resort to violent behaviour (Favre, 2007). This observation makes one wonder about the risk
that exists in grouping these pupils together. This risk resides in the fact that these pupils will spend much of their social time in an environment made up of pupils like themselves who react just like them: strongly as regards cut-off for boys and quite strongly as regards contagion for girls. The work done by teachers to “increase the standing” of these pupils helps us to understand that boys, just like the girls in these classes, have high self-esteem, higher than girls on long courses. Short course classes in Switzerland contain twice as few pupils and, in general, teachers are closer to their pupils: they encourage them and quite often congratulate them. But then how do we explain that it is the girls doing long courses, those who succeed better at school, who have the lowest self-esteem? Overall, boys generally express greater self-esteem than girls, including in the field of school work, (Seidah et al. 2004). Is this because girls are often stricter and more critical than boys in their evaluation of themselves (Bolognini et al., 1996), or to take up again Harter’s proposals (1999), could it be that puberty has the effect of distancing the girls’ real self from their ideal self, whereas in boys it helps them to bring their real self closer to their ideal self? Does the way we see ourselves depend more on our own idea or that of others?

Our study does not allow us to answer these questions directly but points to the likelihood that teenagers do not perceive violent behaviour as abnormal but, on the contrary, as something that gives them a better standing. Now, this behaviour, degrading to others, is associated with cut-off from their authors’ emotions. To explain this phenomenon we suggest taking into account the interferences between systems of values and motivation, and self-esteem.

2. THREE SYSTEMS OF MOTIVATION IN INTERACTION, BUT WHAT ARE THEIR LINKS WITH SELF-ESTEEM?

Complex models, that is to say, taking into account different types of motivations, have already been elaborated (Diel, 1947; Nuttin, 1980; Deci & Ryan, 1985). The same goes for models related to a socio-constructivist approach. Intended as a compromise between nativist models (the determinants of behaviour are often of an inborn biological origin) and associationist (it is only the physical environment that structures our minds), socio-constructivism clearly recognises the existence of internal factors in man but situates their origin in the environment. In this case, it is above all the social environment which is being considered. Related to a socio-constructivist approach, the self-regulated learning models elaborated in the context of school learning emphasise the fact that involvement in learning, perseverance in the face of difficulties and the progress made, depend on cognitive and motivational factors (Pintrich, 2000). As regards the latter, several works have brought to light the roles of the achievement goals that learners set themselves (Vandewalle et al., 1999), their feeling of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986), the costs and utilities perceived (Eccles et al., 1983). This latter model combines expectations related to self-perception and subjective values of the task (task utility, the pleasure of carrying it out, the importance of work well done, costs in terms of effort or renouncement). This model presents the interest of integrating several motivational factors like causal attributions (Weiner, 1983) or the feeling of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1986) whilst at the same time enrolling them in a socio-cultural context. In conclusion, for a given task an individual gets more involved if he is intrinsically motivated
to carry it out, if he attaches importance to it and if its representation of the cost of doing it in terms of effort is low, than if these conditions are not all there.

However, although all these models may have certain similarities and be complementary to the one we are going to present here, their constructions are related to a different approach from ours. In particular, these motivation models do not take compulsion into account (in reference to the psychoanalytical current), nor addiction with or without drugs (in reference to a neurobiological approach to motivation).

The modelling of human motivations that we built (Favre and Favre, 1993), wants precisely to answer to the shortcomings of previous theories:

- behaviourist theories which only privilege an individual’s extrinsic motivations;
- certain current humanist psychological theories which tend to recognise in human beings only the drive which is intrinsic to development;
- and the psychoanalytical theory which was developed from observing pathological cases and gave rise to the phenomenon of compulsion, in other words the difficulty for a human being to modify his behaviour or ideas.

The idea is to make the most of what one has learned and the limits of already existing theories and take into account the properties of reinforcement nerve circuits and also the time difference in biological maturation between starting up these circuits in relation to emotions and feelings – right from before birth – and that of the brain areas associated with cognitive processing – whose maturity ends at around 15 to 16 years old.

Working from neurobiological data related to «positive and negative behaviour reinforcement circuits», the model proposed hereafter integrates these different psychological approaches by identifying and formalising three modes of functioning, three «motivation systems » for these nerve circuits

- the system of reassurance motivation,
- the system of innovation motivation,
- the system of parasitic reassurance motivation or addiction motivation,

During psychological development, the first two systems relay each other, the second gradually replacing the first; but the third system may take over and make this relay difficult sometimes to the point of making phases of development such as adolescence abort. In this case, «normal» psychological maturation is substituted by addictive behaviour, like a form of drug-addiction but without drugs, in which addiction to violence would appear to be the most dangerous both individually and collectively (Favre, 2007).

2.1. In the Beginning, the Desire to Satisfy Fundamental Biological and Psychological Needs…

In this first motivation system, or reassurance motivation, which is preponderant in early childhood but present throughout life, the feeling of well-being is associated with the satisfaction of biological needs and psychological essentials, in a relationship of dependence on others. This satisfaction brings about an immediate temporary reduction in the tension
related to a lack of food, contact, etc. When this need is satisfied, desire disappears and pleasure may be replaced by displeasure. For example, if a baby shows his hunger by shouting and his mother breast feeds him, he will feel great pleasure. But if, once this need has been fulfilled, the mother continues to feed her baby, it will become unpleasant for him, like for most of the pleasures in this first motivation system.

In this motivation system, satisfactions/frustrations predominate at a time in life when individual conscience is developing; the subject is in external reference. Each child needs to feel this pleasure that forges his primary confidence in himself and in life and gives him the possibility of opening himself up to others, of establishing lasting ties and feeling accepted unconditionally (Winnicott, 1975). Frustration comes from the impossibility to access, or the fear of losing access, to this type of pleasure. During the child's development, this first motivation system loses its importance as the individual's main driving force. It remains, however, and manifests itself when we take pleasure in carrying out tasks that we easily master, when we find people who are dear to us, etc. The functioning of the reassurance motivation recalls the Freudian notion of pleasure, also based on the relief of tension, and tends to re-establish the subject's internal equilibrium (Freud, 1915). More or less automatic behaviour may also correspond to "non-self determined behaviours" presented by Deci and Ryan (1985), in which emotion or feelings are not consciously integrated by the subject or only slightly so.

Together with this motivation system may be set up a self-esteem which depends on others and therefore depends on an external reference. Each person is indeed a social being who develops in contact with others. The perception he has of himself is forged right from his first years of life. The fact of having been desired, accepted unconditionally as a person, shows him that he/she is worthy of interest. What the parents and friends say about the child and the ways they act towards him will have a direct influence on his perception of himself, his feeling of having a value or not...and therefore on his self-esteem. However, self-esteem is also based on the opinion that we have of ourselves through what we have achieved and what we believe to be.

2.2. …In Parallel, Progressive Development of Autonomy and Responsibility…

In the second motivation system, innovation motivation, the origin of pleasure is behaviour with which a human being gains autonomy (physical, intellectual or affective), overcomes difficulties, solves problems, shows his aptitudes, and demonstrates creativity and innovation. Everybody has noticed that when the need to understand has been satisfied, it triggers the desire to learn even more, until it becomes a passion (research scientist for example). This type of pleasure does not run out because it does not result in appeasement of a tension but in a movement of growth or becoming aware of the self. It is therefore indissociable from a position of responsibility. The satisfactions associated with these behaviours are often out of phase over time and therefore require a sustained investment. The perspective of a new difficulty is a source of anxiety, tempered by the reminder of earlier successes and the experience of a change as a source of well-being and pushing oneself over one’s limits. The reference that founds the security of the subject’s reassurance is internal and presents two facets: on the one hand, interiorisation of the love and esteem he received from
adults (primary confidence due to the reassurance motivation) when this was possible during childhood; and on the other hand the self-esteem and confidence in the world around him, which we may qualify as secondary as these are acquired. In this case, this secondary confidence and the innovation motivation are closely associated with what the individual has learned to do. Consequently separation, grief over certain situations, behaviour or people, is much easier than with reassurance motivation. Very early on, a human child may discover pleasure related to the innovation motivation, especially if his human environment encourages him to become autonomous. Later, one may indeed feel pleasure in the reassurance motivation by finding one’s old friends again or by re-reading a novel, but also feel the pleasure of innovation motivation by meeting someone who makes one see the world from a new viewpoint or in discovering a new game. The frustration in innovation motivation is linked to what is perceived as routine, being trapped by what is already familiar or foreseeable, in certitudes.

We may make parallels between innovation motivation like the « drive to evolve » as described by Diel (1947), the « drive for individuation » as described by Jung (1947), the « tendency for all human beings to update themselves » as mentioned by Rogers, and the « drive for achievement » mentioned by Atkinson and Feather (1966). Maslow (1983) highlighted the fact that people motivated by a « drive for development » have less dependence on outside influences (advertising, sophisticated pleasure). Like Nuttin (1980 p. 201-204), we consider psychological development through two complementary movements working in opposite directions: « one going down towards relief, balance and rest; the other breaks the equilibrium found and builds states of tension and structures of growing complexity ». Behaviour motivated by the innovation motivation seems to be initiated by a choice, or at least a conscious intention, close to what Deci and Ryan (1985) qualify as self-determined behaviour.

With this motivation system, self-esteem no longer depends directly on others but on an internal reference, from the way we have faced our trials, crises in general and learning, including school learning. This self-esteem has one affective dimension and one dimension based on achieving potential goals « worthy of ourselves », and corresponding to the image and self-esteem built up in relationships with others. Each trial overcome, each thing learnt successfully, has repercussions on two levels: “1- now I can do it and, 2- I am worthy and deserving”, which contributes to building up one’s own value.

One may understand the complementarity of these two esteems, one which depends on an external reference and one which depends on an internal reference, through the example of Pierre Tap’s granddaughter (1998, p. 30): Marine, aged 5 who asks her mother: « Mummy, do you prefer being yourself or like everybody else ? ». Her mother’s answer: « I prefer being myself! ». Marine : « Because you know, Mummy, sometimes I prefer being myself and sometimes I prefer being like everyone else ! ». This complementarity corresponds to Pierre Tap’s idea that, when the children conform to what others expect, they are also confirmed in their own specificity. These two forms of motivation and self-esteem may therefore coexist and relay each other over the course of life. The two motivation systems that we have just described are only opposed to each other by their associated behaviours: the desire for security in stability for the reassurance motivation, desire for discovery for the innovation motivation.

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7 In this perspective, learning periods carried out over time are considered as mini psychological crises that the subject must overcome (Favre, 2007, pp. 161-176).
motivation. The complementarity and opposition between these two desires can be conceived if we admit that a minimum amount of security is required to dare to step into the unknown, take the risk of learning something new. Reciprocally, success in trials increases our feeling of security, the feeling of our value and our personal esteem. However, the progressive takeover of motivation for reassurance by motivation for innovation may be damaged if the first motivation system has been excessively reinforced. A third type of desire, of a reactional kind, is then likely to develop, the parasitic reassurance motivation. By conforming too strongly to the image of himself imposed by those around him, the child may then be confused with this image and develop a third type of self-esteem in reaction to this.

2.3. …With Risks of Addiction Motivation Linked to Excessive Dependence

In the first paragraph, we described an « ideal » course towards maturity. However, it often happens that a parasitic infection gets in the way of reassurance motivation. In this case, the part of innovation motivation is weak, the adult remaining a prisoner to teenage or even childish behaviour, which often becomes addictive. In an attempt to explain this, we made the hypothesis of the existence of « foreign programs », the expression used as an analogy with the behaviour of certain viruses which, by injecting their genetic instructions into the cells, divert them from their original destination. These foreign programs strengthen the force of the first motivation system (the reassurance motivation) by causing the repetition of deeds or thoughts that limit the development of individual autonomy. They result from interiorising verbal and non-verbal injunctions and are generally built up during childhood, as an adaptation response to a request from the human environment. Messages like: « you are this (hopeless, ugly, beautiful, great…) or not that (…),… not as good as your brother, more than your sister… » are integrated into the subject's identity during childhood, and he transforms them into « I am this and that … ». Subconsciously these messages linger and get in the way of the person's blooming by locking him into a logic of immediacy and in the search for « always more ». This search is related to an impossible adequacy between what is obtained and the conformity with the interiorised self-image. The latter could function as a dimension of a « false self », if this impregnation is early on (Winnicott, 1965, p.121). The person tolerates these hypnotic-type injunctions, limiting for his psychological maturation, his « individuation » (Jung, 1933)8, as they are source of another type of pleasure, the pleasure of addiction which corresponds to a third form of motivation: the parasitic reassurance motivation system.

With this latter motivation system, pleasure is associated with excessive dependence on certain products, behaviour, people or situations, and can be recognised by the signs of exclusivity which the subject expresses (for example: « I can’t feel good without such and such a product », « I can’t imagine being on my own ») or by the disproportion of emotions felt (for example: « I loathe people who monopolise the conversation »).

8 According to Jung, the only aim of individuation is to free the self, on the one hand from the person's false envelopes and, on the other hand, the suggestive force of subconscious images. In a lecture given at the Ernomo Meeting at Ascona, Switzerland in 1951, Jung said: « I will try to explain the term "individuation" as simply as possible. By it, I mean the psychological process that makes of a human being an "individual"-a unique, indivisible unit or "whole man." http://www.cgjungpage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=526&Itemid=40
One may suppose that these reactions come from the fact that the child has not had the benefit of «good enough» love (Winnicott, 1975). The importance of the narcissic problem "powerlessness–total power" in several of these violent, destructive, repeated antisocial behaviours, has been reported by Mazet and Rachidi in 2010. This allowed them to establish a link between narcissic disorders and self-esteem. In an environment which is «not good enough» the child may have been frustrated and/or «overfed» with the reassurance motivation during the close relationships of early childhood, which afterwards maintains him dependent on others and in the position of an object. It is also possible that during growth his human environment, only gave him very few signs of esteem and did not encourage him to develop by himself, thereby limiting the development confidence in himself. Due to these foreign programmes, the individual privileges the dependency relationship as the main source of pleasure and turns away from the behaviour and satisfactions related to individuation.

Other authors noticed this parasitic nature of motivation. Freud (1947) was one of the first to show that holding back the drive for life during the course of development led to the persistence of childhood desires in adulthood. Diel (1947) explained that when the essential desire to establish oneself is contradicted, it may be held back and lead to a «false motivation». Deci and Ryan (1985) indicate that a child who has been loved in an unsuitable way may, in compensation for affective frustration, develop a need for substitution, for example an increased need for food. In our opinion, these descriptions explain the modalities of expression for the parasitic reassurance motivation.

The person is torn between two antagonistic motivations of similar intensity: the pleasure of being responsible, for leading one’s life, for «becoming an individual» according to Jung (innovation motivation) and that of remaining dependant, submitted, a prisoner of his self-image which comes from outside in the form of foreign programmes (parasitic reassurance motivation). In short, this person may be characterised by the expression «I’d really like to change on condition that nothing changes!».

With this parasitic reassurance motivation system, self-esteem becomes reactional inasmuch as there will be an excessive motivation to correspond positively or negatively to those whose characteristics (physical, psychological, social…) belong to a model outside the subject, as can be seen in the quest to become the strongest, the best, the most handsome, the most intelligent, the most seductive or the richest...

If the internal conflict between addiction motivation and innovation motivation is prolonged, then suspending individuation will prolong the crisis of adolescence. The individual is therefore often prisoner to repetitive and sometimes compulsive behaviours which keep him tapped in a «circular» stage in which he regularly goes «back to square one»... unless there is a really deep questioning of this balance in the form of a new crisis, to open up to him once more the possibility of accessing «separation-individuation» leading to maturity (Favre and Favre, 1993).

Unlike the theoretical models functioning with two extrinsic and intrinsic motivation systems or with the distinction of external and internal points of control, the integration of a third motivation system: addiction motivation increases the workability of our model. This model makes it possible to see that human subject disposes of three ways of obtaining satisfaction.

Our research devoted to the study of links between school failure and violence show that the motivation for violent behaviours is related to a motivation by default, for lack of something better (Favre, 2007, pp. 71-160). When the pleasure of success in learning
(innovation motivation) and that of being socially recognised as a competent pupil (reassurance motivation) become inaccessible, which is what happens in the case of academic failure, the pupil still has the possibility of becoming a source of anxiety, of scaring others, of feeling strong by making others feel weak. Afterwards, teenagers with this behaviour can no longer do without it (addiction motivation), and this is what they have often confessed during interviews with them. By considering together these three ways of having access to satisfactions which the functioning of our brain may procure, it thereby becomes possible to invent pedagogical devices (Favre and Joly, 2003) which then make it possible, if the subject-pupil so accepts, to shift between his motivation systems. The experiments carried out in primary school and in secondary school (Favre, 2007, pp. 129-160) or, currently in french professional schools show that, when teacher training focuses on « how to develop their pupils’ internal reference » by accompanying them in the destabilisation phase of learning, it allows the pupils to re-motivate themselves for learning whilst at the same time de-motivating them for violence.

This model with three motivation systems, integrating addiction as a way of functioning for the brain and not just as a pathology to be eradicated, makes it possible to realise that there is a possibility (as a degree of freedom) to change the dominant motivation system. The collective works of Klingermann and Carter-Sobell (2007) show that, whatever the addiction, with or without drugs, a large proportion of people may change their behaviour themselves, without any medical treatment and rid themselves of their problems, alcohol, opiates, and dependence on various types of behaviour.

They may change but not all of them do so!

Although, as we found, a small number of pupils (5%) will not adhere to devices allowing them to change their motivation systems during the period when we met them (about seven months), most of them, when we, or the teachers trained for this purpose, restore their reassurance motivation by accepting them unconditionally, by showing them that they are worthy of interest and by creating learning devices requiring their innovation motivation, will recover their taste for learning and be unmotivated for the addiction motivation which is responsible for violent behaviour. We have understood that we should not pay a great deal of attention to behaviour which is often rather disrespectful and rejection which, in our opinion, result from frustration, rather like weaning, from the addiction motivation they then felt. On the other hand, the fact that, manifestly, we showed them that they had not managed to discourage us and that we would go back to them week after week, showed them that they were worthy of our esteem and that they too could begin to be loved, feel proud and therefore restore their reassurance motivation.

To sum up, the three motivation systems that we have just described participate more or less in the individual’s interior economy and they each give him a specific type of pleasure and frustration. We may therefore evaluate the fluctuations of his interior state depending on these three systems and pinpoint (in oneself and in others) those which are at stake in ideal functioning (reassurance and innovation motivations only) or parasitized functioning. One

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9 These were weekly 45 minutes-communication workshops after which these youths, picked out as being violent and whose tests showed strong aggressiveness correlated on the one hand with anxiety and depression and, on the other hand, with a very dogmatic mode of thought, were able to learn to think less dogmatically. They were thus able to affirm themselves without needing to degrade others. Self-affirmation without resorting to violence is the equivalent of having confidence in oneself and therefore means beginning to love oneself (Favre, 2007, pp 129-160).
type of self-esteem may correspond to each of these motivation systems, but two of them complete each other and are associated with psychological maturation: these are self-esteem depending on external reference and self-esteem depending on internal reference.

As for the third type, the reaction type, this is not necessarily related to the subject's real skills. Depending on cases, according to the hypnotic-type injunctions that we call foreign programmes, it may cause a subject to get lost in the compulsive search for performance if the interiorised instruction is: « I am only worthy of love and esteem when I am the first » or, on the contrary, may lead to a just as compulsive self-sabotage, if the instruction is: « you'll end up in prison or on the streets ».

According to the measuring scales for self-esteem used, the existence of reactional self-esteem may lead to apparently paradoxical results, like those we reported in the first part of this chapter.

CONCLUSION

The differences obtained with the academic self-esteem measurement scale (E.T.E.S.) for boys and girls depending on whether they are in long or short courses may be partly explained by the fact that each pupil may have strategies to protect his self-esteem in threatening situations like, for example: not attributing any responsibility for his failure to himself, or choosing points of comparison which are favourable to himself, or not identifying himself with threatening dimensions (sport, mathematics, drawing...depending on the situation) for self-esteem, or there again looking for respect in anti-school dimensions (bullying, spending the night at the police station...) (Martinot, 2001). In this chapter we suggest a complementary explanation. If the pupils, especially girls, manifest stronger academic self-esteem scores when they are doing short courses, in which pupils who have often failed in previous learning are grouped together, we believe that it is because these pupils tend to be more cut off from their emotions and are less empathetic than the others (cf. Tables 1 and 2). So as they are less in touch with themselves and in an environment where teachers often praise and in which the other pupils resemble them, they do not perceive the artificial nature of their situation and develop very high reactional self-esteem.

Conversely, according to our results, the girls who succeed academically may develop particularly low reactional self-esteem if the parental and social context gives them a negative image of themselves, discriminating in a society where only pupils who perform well in all areas may have a place and therefore be worthy of esteem. The most surprising thing is that these results were obtained in one country, Switzerland, where, for years teachers have been making efforts to limit discrimination between men and women. What would things be like in other countries?

The possible existence of three complementary or antagonistic self-esteem may have consequences at a pedagogical level.

In the case of self-esteem depending on external reference, the child can read very early on in the eyes of his parents the feelings he inspires in them. Their love, unconditional and stable, allows him to interiorise that his value represents a stable datum, relatively
independent from notions of success and failure. Going in this direction, we showed\(^{10}\) that it was pertinent to adopt a "postulate of coherence" which may thus be formulated: « each person has good reasons to act in the way he does, to think what he thinks and to feel what he feels ». This attitude prepares one for empathy and may help teachers to accept pupils unconditionally as people; although this must not be confused with a conditional acceptation of behaviours some of which are, depending on our values, acceptable or not.

In order to favour the development of pupils' self-esteem depending on internal reference, the children need to feel that they are accompanied, to get feedback on their activity but we must not forget that it is the fact of having accepted and overcome a trial, something difficult, which then allows them to feel proud of their achievements. The problem therefore is not to « valorise » pupils, but to create conditions in which they will accept to take the risk of learning and then check that they really are capable of confronting difficult times and therefore that they deserve their success. That way, they may recognise their own worth and feel how pleasant it is as a motivation.

Finally it would be better for teachers not to "feed" these pupils’ « foreign programs » by multiplying judgements about their person, by discriminating « good pupils » from « bad pupils », by congratulating them and praising them, by threatening them or by comparing them with one another. Although one part of the adult world privileges competition and economic warfare, it is not necessary for the atmosphere of the class to be assimilated to a bullring or a football stadium. Cooperation between pupils, positioning the teacher as an ally, as a guardian of aims and context, and arranging suitable situations so that learning can be a success constitutes much more favourable conditions for learning and the training of autonomous, responsible citizens. One may believe that those citizens will no longer have to « run » after recognition, power, and money all their lives, or to resort to self-sabotage as a way of life in order to conform to their reactional self-esteem.

Self-esteem is formed by its two indissociable components, the external reference which depends on others and the internal reference which corresponds to an interior attitude consisting of telling oneself that one has a value, and that one is important. This latter attitude leads to knowledge of oneself, to loving and appreciating oneself and accepting oneself as one is with one’s qualities and limits. Cultivating this attitude constitutes a fine mission and a good bet for school!

If the new scales integrating these three types of self-esteem were built, teachers would have tools to evaluate the effects of their teaching on pupils in different domains, not just school, but also social and physical. And so these teachers could show that they are contributing to the training of citizens who will be apt at living together, or would dispose of information inviting them to modify their practices if necessary.

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