The Federalist Papers

Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison

Series: American Political, Economic, and Security Issues
BISAC: HIS038000

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The Federalist Papers, originally published in 1788, is a series of 85 articles written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. The articles were submitted to local newspapers under the pseudonym Publius in response to articles criticizing the newly proposed Constitution. The articles were written in an attempt to influence the vote in favor of adopting the new Constitution.

FEDERALIST No. 1. General Introduction
FEDERALIST No. 2. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
FEDERALIST No. 3. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
FEDERALIST No. 4. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
FEDERALIST No. 5. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
FEDERALIST No. 6. Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
FEDERALIST No. 7. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
FEDERALIST No. 8. The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
FEDERALIST No. 9. The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
FEDERALIST No. 10. The Same Subject Continued (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection)
FEDERALIST No. 11. The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
FEDERALIST No. 12. The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
FEDERALIST No. 13. Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
FEDERALIST No. 14. Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
FEDERALIST No. 15. The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
FEDERALIST No. 16. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 17. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 18. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 19. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 20. The Same Subject Continued (The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union)
FEDERALIST No. 21. Other Defects of the Present Confederation
FEDERALIST No. 22. The Same Subject Continued (Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
FEDERALIST No. 23. The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
FEDERALIST No. 24. The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
FEDERALIST No. 25. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
FEDERALIST No. 26. The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered.
FEDERALIST No. 27. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
FEDERALIST No. 28. The Same Subject Continued (The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)
FEDERALIST No. 29. Concerning the Militia
FEDERALIST No. 30. Concerning the General Power of Taxation
FEDERALIST No. 31. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 32. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 33. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 34. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 35. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 36. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
FEDERALIST No. 37. Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government.
FEDERALIST No. 38. The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed.
FEDERALIST No. 39. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
FEDERALIST No. 40. On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained.
FEDERALIST No. 41. General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
FEDERALIST No. 42. The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
FEDERALIST No. 43. The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered)
FEDERALIST No. 44. Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
FEDERALIST No. 45. The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments.
FEDERALIST No. 46. The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
FEDERALIST No. 47. The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts.
FEDERALIST No. 48. These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other.
FEDERALIST No. 49. Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention.
FEDERALIST No. 50. Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
FEDERALIST No. 51. The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments.
FEDERALIST No. 52. The House of Representatives
FEDERALIST No. 53. The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
FEDERALIST No. 54. The Apportionment of Members Among the States
FEDERALIST No. 55. The Total Number of the House of Representatives
FEDERALIST No. 56. The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of Representatives)
FEDERALIST No. 57. The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation.
FEDERALIST No. 58. Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands.
FEDERALIST No. 59. Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
FEDERALIST No. 60. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
FEDERALIST No. 61. The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members)
FEDERALIST No. 62. The Senate
FEDERALIST No. 63. The Senate Continued
FEDERALIST No. 64. The Powers of the Senate
FEDERALIST No. 65. The Powers of the Senate Continued
FEDERALIST No. 66. Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered.
FEDERALIST No. 67. The Executive Department
FEDERALIST No. 68. The Mode of Electing the President
FEDERALIST No. 69. The Real Character of the Executive
FEDERALIST No. 70. The Executive Department Further Considered
FEDERALIST No. 71. The Duration in Office of the Executive
FEDERALIST No. 72. The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered.
FEDERALIST No. 73. The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
FEDERALIST No. 74. The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive.
FEDERALIST No. 75. The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
FEDERALIST No. 76. The Appointing Power of the Executive
FEDERALIST No. 77. The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered.
FEDERALIST No. 78. The Judiciary Department
FEDERALIST No. 79. The Judiciary Continued
FEDERALIST No. 80. The Powers of the Judiciary
FEDERALIST No. 81. The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority.
FEDERALIST No. 82. The Judiciary Continued.
FEDERALIST No. 83. The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
FEDERALIST No. 84. Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered.
FEDERALIST No. 85. Concluding Remarks

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